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one’s main interest is faith and reason, but a rounded picture of Farrer’s 
importance as a philosophical theologian is distorted if his spirituality is 
allowed to overshadow his philosophy and theology. As I say, what has 
impressed enthusiasts for Farrer’s work is the way he combined these ele-
ments and held them in creative tension.
Certainly Zeno’s paradox solvitur ambulando. But it is also solved by ra-
tional reflection on the difference between continual motion and segmental 
haltings. Similarly, the paradox of faith solvitur immolando. But it is also 
open to the rational support and clarification by what Rowan Williams 
called Farrer’s “viable and sophisticated natural theology,” of which Austin 
Farrer remained a masterful exponent till the end.
Philosophical Religions from Plato to Spinoza: Reason, Religion, and Autonomy, 
by Carlos Fraenkel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 358 
pages. $79.00 (hardcover).
JAMES BRYSON, McGill University
In a bold and exciting new book, Carlos Fraenkel traces a tradition of what 
he calls “philosophical religion” from its beginnings in ancient Athens 
through Jewish and Christian Alexandria and through medieval Arabic 
falsafa, arriving finally at the early modern thought of Spinoza, who rep-
resents both the culmination of this tradition as well as a challenge to its 
legitimacy by planting the seeds of biblical criticism. This is no mere his-
torical exercise. Fraenkel presents philosophical religion as a response to 
the Enlightenment confidence in the rational autonomy of the individual, 
which he sees as the greatest challenge to maintaining religious culture 
within the parameters of evolving modern institutions that prize the 
equality of all persons ahead of religious authority.
Fraenkel explains that the post-Enlightenment consensus which sepa-
rates philosophy from religion would puzzle historical proponents of 
philosophical religion, who are called to become God-like through the 
perfection of reason, as Plato teaches in the Theaetetus. Thus philosophy 
is the highest form of worship, for which it simultaneously provides the 
foundation. Beginning with the metaphysical concept that God is Reason, 
historical forms of religion are regarded as exhortations to the practice 
of philosophy. Homer, Moses, Christ, and Mohammed employ revelation 
as a tool to set their respective religious communities, composed princi-
pally of non-philosophers, on a path to the philosophical life. This way of 
reading historical religion is an alternative to cultural revolution, which 
would remake society in the image of an ideal Republic based on pure 




philosophy, leaving no room for historical revelation claims. There is an 
element of realpolitik for a philosophical religion that is content with citi-
zens making a discrete contribution to the overall good of society without 
being fully aware of its greater purpose. Acting as philosophy’s handmaid, 
religion is directed towards the good order of the polis, “a community . . . 
best described as a theocracy, a community ruled by God” (6). Through 
the rational autonomy theosis provides the ruling philosophical elite, the 
hoi polloi share in the political autonomy of their society. And while in 
principle the imagined stories of the people are superfluous, their use is 
restored by the philosopher king, a thesis reminiscent of Luc Brisson’s im-
portant work on how Plato saved the myths.
While Fraenkel provides a wonderfully dynamic survey of philosophi-
cal religion in all three of the great Abrahamic faiths, he claims that it is 
Christians who push the concept furthest by making Christ the Logos or 
Mind (Nous) itself. In this way, all people, insofar as they are philosophi-
cal, are implicitly Christians. As students of Philo Judaeus, Clement and 
Origen of Alexandria inherited the problem that their master made cen-
tral: how to integrate the historical forms of their religion with Platonic 
philosophy. The Logos shows the way. In virtue of his knowledge of the 
Logos, Plato becomes a prophet alongside Moses and Christ. All prophets 
make the Logos central, which the Alexandrian Christians show through an 
allegorical reading of the Septuagint.
After a fascinating account of shariah as a call to the Noetic life in 
Al-Farabi and Moses Maimonides, and an interlude on the mediation 
of Averroes to early modern philosophy by way of the Averroist Elijah 
Delmedigo, Fraenkel arrives at the innovative reception of philosophical 
religion by the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza. Tainted for posterity 
by accusations of atheism by certain of his contemporaries, Spinoza is 
rehabilitated by Fraenkel as a proponent of philosophical religion, which 
consists for him in a “philosophical reinterpretation of Christianity” 
(216). Spinoza is ambiguous about the relation between philosophy and 
religion since he both affirms and denies that the God of the philosophers 
is the God of the Bible. He ultimately rejects the false alternatives of “dog-
matism”—which subordinates Scripture to reason—and “skepticism”—
which sets the authority of Scripture over reason—standing firmly in the 
tradition of philosophical religion by accommodating its pedagogical-
political aims, wherein our capacity for self-rule should mirror God’s. 
Fraenkel suggests that Spinoza’s method, though proposed for a Christian 
audience, could equally apply to, say, Islam “[h]ad Spinoza lived in a 
Muslim country” (275). Ironically, such an approach leaves itself open to 
the “secularization of the West” and “undermines any attempt to reinter-
pret a religious or cultural tradition in light of intellectual commitments 
not derived from the text” (281).
Fraenkel admits there is a shadow-history here which he does not take 
up, equally important to understanding the historical interactions of phi-
losophy and religion in the Abrahamic tradition, namely the Neoplatonic 
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(25). Though Neoplatonism clearly influenced Spinoza, the differences 
are fundamental. For example, as Fraenkel points out, as exhaustive sub-
stance, God is causa sui for Spinoza (264), a formula which can be traced 
back to Plotinus, but which Proclus says the father of Neoplatonism uses 
only metaphorically, since the very structure of reality implies that every 
cause is greater than its effect. Because he rejects the hierarchically ordered 
Neoplatonic cosmos, Spinoza is engaged in the philosophical reinterpre-
tation of Christianity only in the broadest sense, since he sees no reason 
for mediation between God and his creatures: Mind exhausts all that is. It 
is for this reason, although Fraenkel does not include them amongst the 
Dutch philosopher’s contemporary critics, that the Cambridge Platonists 
associated Spinoza’s philosophy with atheism. If Fraenkel had begun 
with, say, the Symposium—where philosophy is not defined by what it has 
but by what it lacks—or the Parmenides—which makes the One non-being 
fundamental—rather than the Republic, or indeed stressed certain bits of 
that dialogue where Plato declares that the Good is superior to knowledge 
and being in rank and power (509 B), his story might have reached a dif-
ferent outcome.
Counterfactuals aside, this study is to be commended for both the 
breadth and depth of its learning, and should inspire a rich scholarly dia-
logue going forward. It is especially important that Fraenkel demonstrates 
the continuity of Greek philosophy in the medieval period, that this con-
tinuity is common to Jews, Christians and Muslims, and that, moreover, 
such questions remained and remain relevant for Enlightenment and con-
temporary philosophy and politics.
